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MICHAEL MARTIN AND ROBERT WENDLAND:
BEYOND THE VEGETATIVE STATE
Lawrence J. Nelson*
Ronald E. Cranford"
INTRODUCTION
Over twenty years ago, the parents of Karen Quinlan iwished to dis-
continue the ventilator that was supporting the life of their unconscious
daughter. They were forced to litigate against the physicians who re-
fused to carry out this wish. Karen was in the persistent vegetative state
(PVS), a wakeful condition in which awareness of self and others is ab-
sent, and there is no ability to interact with others or the environment.
Under criteria established by the Multi-Society Task Force Report on
the Persistent Vegetative State, her condition was considered
permanent.' In the intervening years, nearly fifty cases involving pa-
tients in the persistent vegetative state have been reviewed by appellate
courts around the country . Overwhelmingly, the courts have permitted
family members to refuse medical treatment on behalf of these patients,
including medically provided nutrition and hydration.
3
In the last few years, several courts4 have delved into controversies
* Ph.D., J.D. Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Santa Clara University.
Faculty Scholar, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, Santa Clara University.
** M.D., Assistant Chief, Department of Neurology, Hennepin County Medi-
cal Center. Faculty Associate, Center for Bioethics, University of Minnesota.
1. See generally The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of
the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1499 (1994). For
purposes of this Article, we will use the much more common term "persistent
vegetative state" as equivalent to "permanent vegetative state" as defined by the
Multi-Society Task Force. See id
2. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 634-45 (2d ed. 1999).
3. "Medically provided nutrition and hydration" means food and fluids pro-
vided under the supervision of a physician to a patient by means of a tube manually
or surgically inserted into the patient's body, viz., nasogastric tube, gastrostomy,
jejunostormy, or central venous line (hyperalimentation). See Lawrence Nelson et
al., Forgoing Medically Provided Nutrition and Hydration in Pediatric Patients, 23
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 33, 33 (1995).
4. See generally, e.g., In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995), cert. de-
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about stopping medical treatment on patients in a different, but related,
medical category: the minimally conscious state (MCS). Generally
speaking, persons in the minimally conscious state have severely im-
paired consciousness, demonstrate limited and inconsistent signs of cog-
nitive awareness, and thus are not in the persistent vegetative state. A
leading published medical article on this subject characterizes this syn-
drome as a "distinct clinical entity that may occur as a transitional con-
dition for patients evolving to or from [the vegetative state], or a clinical
end point for those with very severe brain damage." 5
A consensus statement by professionals in the fields of rehabilitation
and neurological sciences defines this state as "a condition of severely
altered consciousness in which minimal but definite behavioral evidence
of self or environmental awareness is demonstrated. 6 This consensus
statement proposes that:
One or more of the following clinical features must be clearly
discernible and occur on a reproducible or sustained basis to
make the diagnosis of the minimally conscious state:
1) follows simple commands;
2) gestural or verbal "yes/no" responses (regardless of accu-
racy);
3) intelligible verbalization; and
4) movements or affective behaviors that occur in contingent
relation to relevant environmental stimuli and are not attribut-
able to reflexive activity. Any of the following behavioral ex-
amples provide sufficient evidence for criterion 4, although this
list is not meant to be exhaustive:
a)smiling or crying in response to the linguistic or visual
nied, 516 U.S. 113 (1996); In re Conservatorship of Wendland, Probate Case No.
65669 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Jan. 21, 1997 & Mar. 9, 1998), appeal pend'g, No. C029439
(Cal. Ct. App., 3d App. Dist. 1998); In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (1997).
5. Joseph Giacino et al., Development of Practice Guidelines for Assessment
and Management of the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, 12 J. HEAD
TRAUMA & REHABILITATION 79, 83 (1997). This article, written by participants in
the 1994 Aspen Neurobehavioral Conference and members of the Aspen Working
Group on the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, is a preliminary report
on the consensus-based conclusions of this group. The more definitive report from
this group is referred to in note 6, infra.
6. THE ASPEN NEUROBEHAVIORAL CONFERENCE WORK GROUP, ASSESSMENT,
PROGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF THE VEGETATIVE AND MINIMALLY CONSCIOUS
STATES: THE ASPEN NEUROBEHAVIORAL CONFERENCE CONSENSUS STATEMENT
12-13 (forthcoming 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors) [herein-
after ASPEN CONSENSUS STATEMENT].
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content of emotional but not neutral topics or stimuli;
b)vocalizations or gestures that occur in direct response to
the linguistic content of questions;
c) reaching for objects that demonstrates a clear relationship
between object location and direction of reach;
d)touching or holding objects in a manner that accommodates
the size and shape of the object;
e) pursuit eye movement or sustained fixation that occurs in
direct response to moving or salient stimuli; and
f) ambulation or wheelchair propulsion with avoidance of en-
vironmental obstacles.7
This consensus statement also describes two other noteworthy aspects
of the minimally conscious state. One, the presence of these four key
clinical features may vary widely among minimally conscious patients;
therefore, patients in MCS may appear quite different in certain areas of
function that indicate consciousness - yet all such patients have only
minimal consciousness. The statement notes:
While it is not uncommon for individuals in MCS to demon-
strate more than one of the above criteria, in some cases the evi-
dence for MCS will be limited to only one behavior that pro-
vides sufficient evidence for consciousness. For example, some
individuals do not demonstrate discernible evidence of com-
mand-following, object use or communication ability but are
able to ambulate or even climb stairs with minimal assistance.8
Second, while the establishment of behavioral criteria for demarcating
the boundary between unconsciousness and consciousness has certain
practical advantages, this approach is limited in its underlying concep-
tual justification. The statement continues:
[The establishment of these criteria] presumes that [the vegeta-
tive state] and MCS have distinct borders when they may actu-
ally represent points along the same continuum of conscious-
ness. Additionally, the process by which specific behaviors are
designated as evidence of consciousness is relatively arbitrary..
. . These diagnostic criteria for MCS will require validation from
subsequent research. 9
Consequently, the line between the vegetative state and MCS may not be
distinct.
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id.
9. Id
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Two recent court cases, In re Martin' and Conservatorship of Wend-
land," contain strikingly similar facts and result in strikingly similar
judicial resolutions. Both involved middle-aged males who were left
with severe and irreversible brain damage as a result of auto accidents.
Both men were unable to communicate in any meaningful way, inconti-
nent of bowel and bladder, unable to eat by mouth and dependent on
medically provided nutrition and hydration, and completely dependent
on the care of others. All medical experts involved agreed that the pa-
tients were outside the vegetative state, even though neither could per-
form meaningful daily activities. Both were severely brain damaged, yet
conscious to some degree and in the minimally conscious state because
they demonstrated one or more of the clinical features mentioned above.
Their wives, with the support of their children, acted on what they
perceived to be the previously expressed wishes of their husbands and
directed termination of all life-sustaining medical treatment - including
medically provided nutrition and hydration. However, other family
members were adamantly opposed to stopping treatment on their rela-
tives in both cases. Mr. Martin's mother and sister both disagreed with
his wife's decision, and Mr. Wendland's mother and half-sister opposed
his wife's choice. When physicians were unable to reach any resolution,
both cases went into litigation in order to settle the dispute.
In the most recent and controlling ruling in each case, the judges
reached similar resolutions based upon similar reasoning. In both cases,
the courts denied the request of the wife to cease treatment and ruled
that medically provided nutrition and hydration (in the case of Mr.
Wendland) 2 and all medical treatment (in the case of Mr. Martin)
should be continued indefinitely. These rulings largely rested on the
courts' determinations that under the "clear and convincing" evidentiary
10. 538 N.W.2d 399, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1113 (1996).
11. Probate Case No. 65669 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 1997 & Mar. 9, 1998),
appealpend'g., No. C029439 (Cal. Ct. App., 3d. App. Dist. 1998).
12. The court's final order only precludes Mrs. Wendland from stopping his
medically provided nutrition and hydration. At present, as his legally appointed
conservator with medical decision making authority, she has the authority to refuse
to consent to all other forms of medical treatment for her husband. See In re
Wendland, Probate No. 65669, slip. op. at 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 1997). For
example, a physician's order not to attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Mr.
Wendland in the event of a cardiac or pulmonary arrest is presently in effect at Mrs.
Wendland's direction.
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standard laid out by the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director,13 the pa-
tients had not refused the treatment in question prior to incompetency.
These rulings were also heavily influenced by the courts' perception that
current state law could not be applied to the cases, despite the fact that
both states had precedent relating to the cessation of treatment on pa-
tients in a persistent vegetative state.
These two decisions, in conjunction with a recent Wisconsin case, 4
can be described as representing what appears to be an emerging judicial
trend to distinguish the persistent vegetative state from other forms of
permanent and profound neurological damage, such as the minimally
conscious state. In addition, the decisions represent a trend not to treat
minimally conscious patients like vegetative patients, despite the medi-
cal and practical connection between the two conditions and the similar
response of spouses, and other family members, about the unacceptabil-
ity of this condition to the patient. This Article, provides a preliminary
legal and ethical assessment of the present controversy over discontinu-
ing medical treatment of patients in the minimally conscious state.
First, this Article describes both the facts 5 and the judicial resolution
of the cases of Mr. Martin and Mr. Wendland in greater detail. 16 Then,
this Article comments on the legal, ethical, and medical implications of
13. 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990). See generally Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d
408 (Mo. 1988); In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
14. In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wisc. 1997). Although similar in some
important respects to Martin add Wendland (e.g., the patient was not in the vegeta-
tive state but was minimally conscious as a result of advanced Alzheimer's dis-
ease), we are omitting any discussion of Edna in this article for purposes of focus
and clarity.
15. Our presentation of the facts of these cases is based on several sources:
The published decisions of In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995), 504
N.W.2d 917 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) and 517 N.W.2d 749 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994);
Andrew Broder & Ronald Cranford, "Mary, Mary Quite Contrary, How was I to
Know?" Michael Martin, Absolute Prescience, and the Right to Die in Michigan,
72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 787 (1995); and Dr. Cranford's personal knowledge of
the facts gathered as an expert witness in both cases.
16. As it affects the authors' understanding of, and point of view on, these
matters, it should be noted that Dr. Cranford served as a pro bono expert medical
witness and advisor in both the Martin and Wendland cases. Dr. Nelson served as
pro bono expert bioethics witness in the Wendland case. He is currently repre-
senting Mr. Wendland's wife of 20 years, Rose, on a pro bono basis in her appeal
of the trial court's ruling. Mr. Wendland is separately represented by court ap-
pointed counsel.
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foregoing medical treatment, as well as requiring continued treatment,
of minimally conscious patients. The judicial resolution in those cases
manifests an ignorance of, or an intentional disregard of, the many fac-
tual similarities between persons in both the vegetative and minimally
conscious states. They also assume that any degree of consciousness in a
person makes a decision to forego life-sustaining treatment much more
legally and ethically problematic, if not outright impermissible, than a
parallel decision for a patient in the vegetative state. As ethical continu-
ity exists between the manner in which patients in these states ought to
be treated, there is a question as to the validity and coherence of this
assumption. For these reasons, although this trend in judicial resolution
is not surprising, it remains troubling and worthy of critical scrutiny.
I. OVERVIEW OF MARTIN AND WENDLAND
On January 16, 1987, Michael Martin, his wife, and three children
were all severely injured in an automobile accident when the family's
car was hit by a train near their home in Moline, Michigan. Michael's
seven-year-old daughter, Melanie, died instantly as a result of the crash.
His wife and two other children suffered multiple injuries from which
they eventually recovered. Michael, who was thirty-six at the time of the
accident, sustained severe and permanent neurological injuries.
Over the last eleven years, and up to the time of the judicial proceed-
ings in the early 1990s, Michael has not improved in any significant
way. His left side is completely paralyzed. His right side shows minimal
movements of the fingers and leg, and he can move muscles in his
throat, lips, and tongue. Michael is unable to eat, walk, talk, or control
his bladder and bowel. He is dependent on medically provided nutrition
and hydration. He is conscious to some extent, but unable to communi-
cate in any meaningful, consistent manner.
He is aware to some extent that questions are being addressed to him
by others, and he can, and does, respond with "yes" and "no" answers
by head movements. Unfortunately, the "yes" and "no" responses are
"consistently inconsistent."' 17 This means that at times he may answer a
question correctly, but most of the time his answers are incorrect and
indicate, for example, that he has little or no ability to recognize familiar
words, faces, names, or places. When Michael was questioned in detail
by Dr. Cranford prior to trial, he nodded "yes" when he was asked if he
could eat, walk, and talk. He repeatedly nodded "yes" when asked if he
17. Broden & Cranford, supra note 15, at 799.
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was taking food and water by mouth, and also denied that he was wear-
ing a diaper, that he had a feeding tube, that he was paralyzed, and that
he could not go to the bathroom by himself. These answers were all
factually incorrect.
Prior to this accident, Michael was a sportsman who loved the out-
doors. He was physically strong, active, and independent. He also had an
almost pathological fear of illness, weakness, helplessness, and depend-
ency. He often denied illness even when he was sick. When he would go
hunting, he would often talk to his wife about his fear of being acciden-
tally shot and disabled, or being rendered helpless and dependent. He
was also fearful of being in a hospital and dealing with doctors.
Michael's wife, Mary, felt very strongly that his prior lifestyle, con-
duct, and explicit statements indicated that Michael would not want to
continue living in a dependent state. One specific comment that Mary
said her husband had made in the past was that if she permitted him to
endur an existence of helplessness and hopelessness after an injury or
illness, he would "haunt her until the day she died." Based on the previ-
ously expressed wishes of the patient and his lifestyle, Mary, her two
children, and Michael's brother, requested that all treatment, including
medically provided nutrition and hydration, be terminated and that Mi-
chael be allowed to die. However, Michael's mother and sister strongly
opposed this action, which resulted in extensive court proceedings in
Michigan over a three year period.
The trial court determined that there was clear and convincing evi-
dence that before losing his mental capacity to decide, Michael ex-
pressed his preference to decline life-sustaining medical treatment under
the circumstances he faced. Although the Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, and litigation in this
matter has come to an end.
Robert Wendland was forty-two years old when he was involved in a
motor vehicle accident near Stockton, California on September 29,
1993. This accident left him comatose due to severe head injuries. Al-
though Robert remained unresponsive for many months after the acci-
dent, sometime in late 1994 or early 1995, his wife noticed that he began
to develop signs of cognitive responsiveness. By the early summer of
1995, he was inconsistently but definitely interacting at a conscious
level with his environment. For example, in therapy sessions he could
pick up designated objects with his left hand with some regularity, but
he consistently needed much cueing from the therapists to accomplish
1999]
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this. With encouragement and direction, he could also maneuver an
electric wheelchair by himself and go down a corridor and make a left-
hand turn. However, he could not avoid objects in .his way or move his
chair if it hit a wall or other obstacle.' 8
He showed some degree of intermittent and inconsistent visual pur-
suit. His right side was completely paralyzed, and his left side was mod-
erately weak. Robert sometimes showed other definite signs of volun-
tary movement on the left side, such as scratching his nose or making
other apparently purposeful movements of the left arm toward his face.
N6t infrequently during physical therapy, he would manifest a definite
snarl on his face and was observed to strike out at the therapist with his
left hand. He became increasingly agitated during prolonged therapy
sessions and at other times as well. He rarely responded to yes and no
questions, and when he did, his answers were extremely inconsistent.
Usually, he responded only with maximal cueing from another person.
Robert is married with three children. He is described by his wife,
Rose, as a hard working man who carried three jobs when she first met
him. He was very quiet, private, and rather taciturn. Some characterized
him as a workaholic. To relax, he liked to read, the Bible in particular.
When Robert's father-in-law died in the summer of 1993, he seemed to
take this loss very hard and began drinking excessively. After experi-
encing difficulties with the quality of Rose's father's death, he spoke
with his brother Mike, and indicated that if he were ever being kept
alive by feeding tubes and life-support machines, he wouldn't want
Mike to allow him to continue in that situation. Ironically and tragically,
his wife and brother confronted him about his drinking and driving just
five days prior to the accident, and he stated at this time that if he were
in a "terrible accident" and lived, "you know what my feelings are.
Don't let that happen to me. Just let me go. Leave me alone . . . . I
wouldn't want my children to ever see me like that."
Since July of 1995, Robert has demonstrated little, if any, further neu-
rologic recovery. His mother has reported being hugged by Robert and
seeing other signs of responsiveness, but these have not been confirmed
by any other observer. Some dispute has existed among some of Rob-
ert's health care providers and other outside medical experts concerning
whether he might improve in cognitive function. However, two inde-
18. His ability to use the control of an electric wheelchair was personally wit-
nessed twice by Dr. Nelson and once by Dr. Cranford. Mr. Wendland no longer
engages in this activity.
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pendent medical examiners retained by Robert's court appointed trial
counsel concluded there was no evidence of further improvement in
cognitive functions beyond early 1995. When the patient was examined
by these two independent medical examiners in the latter half of 1997,
he demonstrated minimal but definite signs of consciousness and fol-
lowed some commands with significant prompting.
Both of these independent medical examiners concluded that Robert's
prognosis for further recovery was poor and that further aggressive re-
habilitation would prevent or minimize some medical complications but
would not enhance his neurologic condition or significantly improve his
functional status. Both doctors found that he clearly displays dysphoria
9
and combativeness. However, this is understandable given the pain as-
sociated with the degree of his spasticity, 20 the presence of
contractures, 21 his ongoing dental problems, and the extent of his brain
injury. These same experts reexamined him in December of 1998 and
reaffirmed their prior conclusions.
Robert's wife, children (two of whom were in their teens at the time
of the accident), and his brother, Mike, were convinced that Robert
would not want to live in his present state. However, Robert's mother
and half-sister, Rebecca, opposed this conclusion claiming that he would
not want to go against God by committing suicide and ending up in hell.
However, uncontradicted evidence presented at the trial showed that
Robert was estranged from both his mother and Rebecca. Specifically,
Rose testified that neither had even been in their home for the last ten
years. Neither celebrated birthdays or holidays with them, and their
children had never received cards or gifts from their grandmother. Rob-
ert refused to give Rebecca away at her wedding or to even attend the
event, and when Rose and Robert had first met, he was afraid to intro-
duce her to his family for fear that she would no longer love him if he
did.
After several years of legal maneuvers, including several appeals by
19. That is, disquiet, restlessness, or malaise. Dysphoria is a state of emotional
pain where one is unable to bring oneself to a state of calmness or relaxation. See
RIcHARD SLOANE, THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL
DICTIONARY 202 (1992 Supp.).
20. "[A] state of hypertonicity, or increase over the normal tone of a muscle,
with heightened deep tendon reflexes." Id. at 480.
21. Contractures are, "[a] condition of fixed high resistance to passive stretch
of a muscle, resulting from fibrosis of the tissues supporting the muscles or the
joints, or from disorders of the muscle fibers." Id. at 164.
1999]
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the mother and half-sister, the trial court held eight weeks of hearings in
the Fall of 1997 and the early part of 1998. In March of 1998, the court
ruled that Rose lacked the legal authority to discontinue Robert's medi-
cally provided nutrition and hydration, although it refused the mother's
and half-sister's petition to be named Robert's conservator in place of
Rose. At the time of this article's publication, Rose and Robert, through
their court appointed appellate counsel, were appealing the judge's rul-
ing. A ruling from the California Court of Appeal is not expected until
the summer of 1999.
II. DECISIONS OF THE COURTS
Before looking more closely at each decision, several basic similari-
ties in the judicial resolution of the disputes and the reasoning upon
which they rest should be noted. First, in both cases the neurological
consensus was that the patient was outside the vegetative state. In other
words, both patients manifested some minimal degree of consciousness
inconsistent with the vegetative state. This apparently led the courts to
hold that previous law concerning the discontinuation of life-sustaining
treatment in vegetative patients was inapplicable. 22 In essence, these
rulings distinguished the vegetative state from the minimally conscious
state as a matter of law, divorcing existing case law from the judicial
resolution of disputes arising in this new category of patients.
Second, neither court offered much justification for distinguishing the
vegetative state from the minimally conscious state. At bottom, both
simply assumed that the minimally conscious state is somehow radically
different - medically, legally, and ethically - from the vegetative
state. According to these courts, a minimally conscious person must be
treated differently when questions arise concerning the maintenance of
their lives with medical treatment. The courts also assume that the con-
sequences of making termination of treatment decisions for non-
vegetative patients and society are far more dangerous than similar deci-
sions made for vegetative patients. These assumptions, which beg for
justification, largely determined the outcome of these cases.
22. The patient in Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633,
635 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), was vegetative, as were the patients in Barber v. Supe-
rior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); In re Conservatorship of
Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 1024
(1989); and In re Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal.Rptr. 530, 531 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988).
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In fact, these two courts were far more concerned about projected
social consequences to anonymous persons than the interests and rights
of the particular injured individuals and their close family members. As
interpreted by their spouses and other family members, both Michael
and Robert expressed their wishes about continued existence in a pro-
foundly disabled state quite clearly and directly. Both have some capac-
ity for experiencing pain and suffering, and yet their continued existence
is assumed to be benign to them in this regard. This assumption is
plainly unwarranted in Robert's case due to his general dysphoria and
other signs of negative affect and is questionable in Michael's case. In
addition, the wives' pain and frustration of being unable to effectuate
their husbands' wishes in the face of a dismal prognosis for recovery
was overlooked or discounted.
Third, using slightly different reasoning, both courts came to the same
conclusions that the patients must make non-treatment decisions them-
selves in advance, and that the clear and convincing evidence standard
should apply to establish that they have made these decisions. However,
despite strong and persuasive evidence of each patients' previously ex-
pressed wishes about living in a severely impaired state,23 the courts
23. Mr. Wendland's brother and wife confronted him about his driving after
drinking alcohol and warned him of the chance that he could be in a terrible acci-
dent and badly injure himself or another. Mr. Wendland responded, "If that ever
happened [sic] to me, you know what my feelings are. Don't let that happen to me.
Just let me go. Leave me alone." Reporter's Transcript at 54, In re Conservator-
ship of Wendland, Probate Case No. 65669 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Jan. 21, 1997 & Mar. 9,
1998). When asked about his children, Robert responded, "You know how I feel
about that Rose. We talked about that with your father. I wouldn't want my-chil-
dren to ever see me like that." Id In reacting to the last days of Rose's father's life,
when he was unresponsive and on life-support, Rose recounted that Robert stated:
Basically that is no way of living. And was I keeping him alive for
myself or was I keeping him alive for my father. And he told me at
that point I would never want to live like that, and I wouldn't want
my children to see me like that and look at the hurt you're going
through as an adult seeing your father like that.
Id. at 49.
According to Mr. Martin's wife, Mr. Martin:
Made a lot of comments to me about never wanting to live 'like a
vegetable.' He said that if anyone had to live like a vegetable, 'their
families and doctors should be shot for forcing someone to live like
that.' He would say, 'I'd be pissed if I had to live that way.' He
also told me that he believed it was unfair to the person who had to
be kept alive on machines because that person would always be in
pain. He also told me that 'no one should have to be kept alive if
they would never get well again.'
1999]
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ruled that this evidentiary standard was not met in either case. Again,
these conclusions are ultimately driven by the assumption that the
minimally conscious state should be sharply distinguished from the
vegetative state for fear of the "slippery slope" effect on the lives of
other minimally conscious patients should Michael's and Robert's
spouses be permitted to discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment.
A. Martin
In Martin the majority opinion correctly acknowledged that competent
persons have a common law right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment, that this right survives incompetence, and that the right may
be discharged by a surrogate decision maker.24 However, the court cast
this right in narrow terms: The right to decide "to refuse medical treat-
ment under the particular circumstances, made while [the patient is]
competent" must be honored when the patient is incompetent.25 The
court stated:
We wish to make clear that we are deciding only that to the ex-
tent the right to refuse medical treatment 'refers to decisions al-
ready made and communicated by the patient before losing the
In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 412 (Mich. 1995). He also told his wife that he
would "always haunt" her if she put him on machines to keep him alive if there was
no hope of getting better. See id.
24. See In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 405-06. For unknown reasons, the court
expressly declined to rule on whether constitutional and statutory grounds existed
for recognizing this right. See id. This judicial maneuver unfortunately permits the
court to dodge the question of whether the constitutional right to refuse treatment,
as expressed in Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990), requires that the
State permit a legally appointed surrogate to make medical decisions on behalf of a
mentally incapacitated patient. For the arguments that the State should not require
clear and convincing evidence of a person's own statements refusing medical
treatment in advance, see In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr 840,
856-57 (1988). There the court wrote:
This approach presents several serious problems. First we have
found no authority - other than cases on the subject of life-
sustaining treatment - to support the idea that a person can exercise(or waive a fundamental constitutional and common law right un-
intentionally through informal statements years in advance. Second,
if one bases the treatment of persistently vegetative patients not on
the statutory delegation of rights to a conservator but on the theory
that an evidentiary hearing can reveal the patient's own hypothetical
choice, one is left with no consistent basis for a decision when a pa-
tient has been silent on the matter.
Id.
25. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 406.
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capacity to make further choices, . . . it is true that the patient's
interest in having those choices honored must survive incapac-
ity.' 2
6
In other words, the patient possesses the right to have his own decisions
enforced, and not to have the right to refuse treatment exercised by an-
other on his behalf, even if his values and interests suggest the exercise
to be a correct one. Accordingly, the surrogate merely is the conduit of
the patient's own decision and does not have any role in the creation of
a decision after the patient becomes incompetent.
By interpreting the right to refuse in this manner, the court precluded
the possibility of approving a standard of surrogate decision making that
would grant the surrogate personal discretion in making the treatment
decision on the patient's behalf. Consequently, it rejected the "substi-
tuted judgment" standard 27 as a legal fiction which simply supplants a
patient's decision to withdraw treatment with that of a surrogate. 28 It
also rejected the "best interests" standard 29 because it is both inconsis-
tent with the common law right to refuse, 30 and it permits another to
"make a determination of a patient's quality of life, thereby undermining
the foundation of self-determination and inviolability of the person upon
which the right to refuse medical treatment stands."'"
The court asserted that a purely subjective analysis of one's right to
refuse is most appropriate in cases of this nature32 because it allows a
surrogate to withhold life-sustaining treatment when it is clear that the
patient would have refused such treatment given the circumstances.33 In
26. Id. (citing James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, Perspectives on Cruzan: The
Sirens' Lure of Invented Consent: A Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate Deci-
sionmakingfor Legally-Incapacitated Older Persons, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 779, 806
(1991)).
27. "Through this standard, the surrogate attempts to ascertain, with as much
specificity as possible, the decision the incompetent patient would make if he were
competent to do so." In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 407.
28. See id. (citations omitted).
29. "The best interest standard is an objective analysis under which the benefits
and burdens to the patient of treatment are assessed by the surrogate in conjunction
with any statements made by the patient if such statements are available." Id
(footnote and citation omitted).
30. This is so largely because the right to refuse is personal in nature, whereas
the best interests standard is inherently impersonal and objective.
31. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 407 (citation omitted).
32. See id
33. See id (citation omitted).
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other words, a purely subjective standard makes the surrogate merely the
messenger of the patient's previous decision. The court affirmed that,
out of respect for the patient's common law right to self-determination,
the decision made by the patient while competent should continue to be
honored regardless of the patient's current condition.34 It added that this
right does not justify or support the exercise of a surrogate's discretion
in medical decision making for an incompetent person by means of a
substituted judgment or best interests standard. Instead, objective stan-
dards - ones not personally exercised by the rights bearer - are
grounded in the State's parens patriae power and therefore may be con-
trolled by the State.35
Specifically, the Martin court ruled that the State can control the use
of a surrogate's own discretion and judgment in making treatment deci-
sions on behalf of an incompetent person by requiring that the patient be
in a certain medical condition before permitting the surrogate to make
any decision at all. The court stated that, "[N]othing . . . prevents the
state from grounding any objective analysis on a threshold requirement
of pain, terminal illness, foreseeable death, a persistent vegetative state,
or affliction of a similar genre." 36 The court was fully aware that certain
circumstances have led other courts to apply tests which are based on
more objective criteria, and noted that patients in such cases have gener-
ally been in a comatose or persistent vegetative state.37 However, the
facts of the case did not present the Martin court with the same situa-
tion.38 The court was directly led to reject permitting the surrogate to use
34. See id at 408.
35. See id. at 408 (citation omitted). Even though the majority opinion sharply
distinguishes the vegetative and minimally conscious states, it nevertheless indis-
criminately mixes these supposedly very different kinds of cases when it discusses
the various decision making standards. For example, the court extensively cites not
only In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) in this regard, a case involving a
profoundly demented yet conscious patient, but also Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S.
261 (1990); In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 206 (N.Y. 1988); In
re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J.), reh'g denied, 531 A.2d 1360 (N.J. 1987); Lincoln
Park Nursing & Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987); and Browning
v. Herbert, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990). All these involve vegetative patients.
Throughout its discussion of these various other cases and the various decision
making standards, the Martin court fails to note the possible distinctions and simi-
larities among the neurologic condition of the patients involved. See id.
36. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 408.
37. See id. (citations omitted).
38. See id
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an objective standard by the fact that Michael Martin had some con-
sciousness and was not vegetative.
In one of the most startling, yet telling, passages in the decision, the
majority opinion reaches the following conclusion: "In this case, Mi-
chael's life and health are not threatened by infirmities of [the] nature
[of his condition]. 39 In reality, being permanently comatose or vegeta-
tive poses no more "threat" to a person's life than being minimally con-
scious like Michael and Robert; all three conditions shorten life expec-
tancy markedly. Moreover, as demonstrated above, it is largely illusory
to assert that the "health" of minimally conscious patients is better than
that of the comatose or vegetative patients. The two conditions are much
more descriptively alike than different. To further illustrate that the
majority did not grasp the actual neurologic condition of Michael Mar-
tin, the court stated that "[b]y all accounts, Michael is not experiencing
any type of pain that would outweigh any enjoyment or pleasure he is
experiencing.
' 40
The Martin court also held that the purely subjective standard for re-
fusal of treatment on an incompetent patient must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence.4' In other words, when a surrogate claims that
an incompetent individual's statements express a decision by that indi-
vidual to refuse life-sustaining treatment, such statements must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence "before the surrogate is al-
lowed to effectuate them., 42 While preferring written directives as evi-
dence of a person's wishes, the court observed that oral statements
might be relevant if they are made under appropriate circumstances. In
their own words, the court concluded that the weight accorded such oral
statements "depends on the remoteness, consistency, specificity, and
solemnity of the prior statement. 43
In any event, the combination of the "purely subjective standard" for
39. Id.
40. Id. at 409 n. 16.
41. See In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 401,406 n.12,410.
Evidence is clear and convincing when it 'produce[s] in the mind of
the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the alle-
gations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and
weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] [sic] to come to
a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts
in issue.'
Id. at 410 (citing In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 441).
42. Id. at 409.
43. Id. at411.
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surrogate decision making for the incompetent with the "clear and con-
vincing" standard of proof places a very heavy burden on the surrogate.
The burden may, for all practical purposes, be literally impossible to
satisfy. As the court held:
Only when the patient's prior statements clearly illustrate a seri-
ous, well thought out, consistent decision to refuse treatment un-
der [the] exact circumstances, or circumstances highly similar to
the current situation, should treatment be refused or withdrawn.
In all events, the proofs in sum must meet the exacting standard
of clear and convincing evidence.44
The court recognized the criticism of this assertion as "possibly creating
too stringent a standard, inhumanely condemning a patient to a 'pro-
longed and painful death,"' but dismissed it because "the facts of this
case do not dictate that we progress beyond a purely subjective standard,
and we refuse to do so.
' 45
The court was also acutely aware of the dilemma posed by the choice
between allowing the minimally conscious patient to die and requiring
him to live. "To err either way has incalculable ramifications. To end
the life of a patient who still derives meaning and enjoyment from life or
to condemn persons to lives from which they cry out for release is
nothing short of barbaric. 46 But when the choice must be made, the
value of maintaining even minimally conscious life trumps: "If we are to
err, however, we must err in preserving life. 47
The central "fact" the court implicitly claimed dominated its decision
was Michael Martin's neurological status of being minimally conscious
and not permanently unconscious. The court was afraid to "progress
beyond a purely subjective standard" because of the potential legal, so-
cial, and ethical ramifications of a surrogate making decisions about the
quality of life of another. In short, the court was worried about the
"slippery slope. 48
44. Id.
45. Id. at 409 (citation omitted).
46. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 401.
47. Id. at 402.
48. Id. at 409 ("We cannot stress too strongly that the complexity and ramifi-
cations of any decision in this area caution against moving too swiftly or adopting'
controversial decision making standards in cases that do not present facts compel-
ling such decision .... As we noted at the outset, if we are to err, we must err in
preserving life. Our first step in this area must be a careful one.").
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B. Wendland
The Superior Court judge hearing Mr. Wendland's case, Bob W.
McNatt, made two central written rulings. In the first, Judge McNatt
noted that Mr. Wendland was an "incompetent person whose cognitive
abilities cannot be determined because of serious brain injuries, but who
is neither terminally ill nor in a persistent vegetative state. 49 In his
view, previous California case law on persons in the vegetative state did
not provide adequate guidance or precedent.50 In this decision, Judge
McNatt placed the burden of proof upon the surrogate decision maker,
namely, Wendland's wife. The standard for surrogate decision making
was to be a best interest approach, but one "tempered with certain sub-
jective considerations." He also established the "evidentiary standard in
situations involving withdrawal of medical treatment from conscious but
cognitively impaired persons [as] 'clear and convincing evidence."'
51
Like the Martin court, Judge McNatt was aware of the fundamental
dilemma the case presented and the possible ramifications of his deci-
sion. In this regard, he echoed, but did not mimic, Martin's language.
He even questioned Martin's reliance on the oft-heard but seldom care-
fully justified preference for the preservation of biological life over the
respect for an individual's wishes to maintain his dignity, the quality of
his life, and the integrity of his human relationships with loved ones and
the world.
[T]he stakes are simply too high and the consequences too dire
to determine an appropriate course of action on a less compel-
ling showing [than clear and convincing evidence]. To bring
about the death of an innocent person who still finds meaning
and enjoyment in life would be barbaric. It would be equally
cruel, however, to force someone who has lost all dignity and
faces only an existence of constant pain or suffering and who
would fervently seek death as a release to go on living merely on
the presumption that life is always preferable to death. 2
Consequently, Judge McNatt wanted to act cautiously in this case. Just
like the Martin court, he worried too much about the possible conse-
quences to others in the minimally conscious state of permitting a surro-
49. In re Wendland, Probate No. 65669, slip op. at I (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 17,
1997).
50. See id,
51. Id. at 16, 17.
52. Id. at 6-7.
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gate to refuse medical treatment, and too little about the specific conse-
quences to Robert Wendland. The judge's caution led him to determine
that treatment ought to continue.53
His caution also led to concerns about his endorsement of the "tem-
pered best interest" approach to surrogate decision making because it
may start a slippery slope. Without reference to the present case, it
would certainly provide the opportunity for unethical conservators of
non-communicative incompetents to try to end the life of patients based
on mere inconvenience, or for personal gain. 5 4 Later in his opinion, the
judge noted that "there are many whose motives and morals are not
equal to [Mrs. Wendland's]" and that permitting treatment to be stopped
in this case "would allow the opening of a door that other families with
less noble motives might follow through. 55
After making the above-mentioned basic legal rulings, Judge McNatt
heard approximately eight weeks of testimony. At the conclusion of
Mrs. Wendland's case, during which she attempted to meet the burdens
placed on her, the attorney for the estranged mother and half-sister made
a motion for summary judgment and contended that the court should
rule in their favor as a matter of law even though they had put forward
no evidence of their own. The judge granted this motion and, in a writ-
ten opinion issued later, held that Mrs. Wendland "has not met her duty
and burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that ...Robert
Wendland, who is not in a persistent vegetative state nor suffering from
a terminal illness, would, under the circumstances, want to die."5 6 She
was also unable to meet "her burden of establishing that the withdrawal
of artificially delivered nutrition and hydration is commensurate with
conservatee's best interests .. .
Like the Michigan Supreme Court, Judge McNatt found that the pa-
tient's previously expressed wishes were legally insufficient to prove the
patient's decision to refuse treatment under the precise circumstances in
53. See id. at 9. "When a situation arises where it is proposed to terminate the
life of a conscious but severely cognitively impaired person, it seems more rational
for the court to ask 'why?' of the party proposing the act rather than 'why not?' of
the party challenging it." Id.
54. In re Wendland, Probate No. 65669, slip op. at 16 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 17,
1997).
55. Id. at 5.
56. In re Wendland, Probate No. 65669, slip. op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 9,
1998).
57. Id.
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which he then existed. He held that:
The court finds that neither of these conversations [about refus-
ing treatment that were testified to by several witnesses] reflect
an exact 'on all fours' description of conservatee's present
medical condition. More explicit direction than just 'I don't
want to live like a vegetable' is required in order to justify ter-
minating the life of someone who is not in a PVS. 8
Although these conversations convinced Robert Wendland's wife of
twenty years, his teen-aged children, and his brother that he did not want
to live in a vegetative state, the conversations did not convince Judge
McNatt. His decision could quite easily lead one to believe that nothing
Robert Wendland could have ever said in advance of being severely
brain damaged would have satisfied Judge McNatt.
Similar to the Martin court, Judge McNatt concluded that in the case
of a patient who was not in the vegetative state and who had not while
competent clearly, directly, and definitively refused the treatment in
question under the precise medical circumstances in question, the court
"must err on the side of caution" and "choose life" for the patient.59 Yet,
unlike the Martin majority, Judge McNatt noted that despite his ruling
"it still can be debated whether [Mr. Wendland's life] is being preserved
or he is being sentenced to [a miserable] life. 60
III. LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASSESSMENT
Although the Martin and Wendland decisions both make a strong le-
gal distinction between decisions to forego treatment for persons in the
vegetative state and those in the minimally conscious state, neither ex-
plained the basis for this distinction. The following is an analysis of the
assumptions and values that underlie the courts' positions.
Both courts seem to focus on the major descriptive differences be-
tween the two states: A vegetative patient has no consciousness whatso-
ever and experiences nothing, while a minimally conscious patient has
some rudimentary degree of consciousness, suffers from severe to pro-
found dementia, and therefore has conscious experiences of some type.
This suggests a major ethical difference. A permanently vegetative pa-
tient really has no morally significant interests whatsoever,6 1 including
58. Id. at 4.
59. See id at 5.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Except, perhaps, for an interest in the very small chance that he or she will
truly emerge from the unconscious state.
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an interest in remaining alive. This is because the overwhelming likeli-
hood is that the patient will never be aware of anything.62
In contrast, a minimally conscious patient, at the very least, has an
interest in avoiding pain, suffering, the possible burdens of continued
treatment, and other unpleasant or debilitating experiences and in having
pleasant, happy, or personally satisfying experiences; this includes an
interest in remaining alive. Like the vegetative patient, the minimally
conscious patient has an interest in emerging from this state and going
back to a more functional form of human existence, however unlikely
this may be.
Despite these differences, the vegetative and minimally conscious
states are actually quite similar in many respects. First, most persons in
these conditions are unable to perform any of the typical activities of
daily living such as walking or meaningfully communicating with oth-
ers. Second, they are totally dependent upon others for care such as toi-
leting, dressing, or feeding themselves. Third, as both groups of persons
are profoundly physically and mentally limited and rendered largely
inactive by their condition, both are subject to the medical complications
of their inactivity, such as bedsores, infections, and contractures. Fur-
thermore, the life expectancy of both groups is greatly shortened as a
direct consequence of their medical conditions. The data supporting this
claim, however, is much more extensive for vegetative patients than for
the minimally conscious. 63 In sum, persons in the vegetative and mini-
mally conscious states are profoundly dysfunctional.
62. Good recovery after one year in the vegetative state or in the minimally
conscious state has never been documented in the medical literature. See ASPEN
CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 6, at 7-8; see also Multi-Society Task Force,
supra note 1, at 1572.
63. Recent data has shown persuasively that life expectancy is substantially
shortened for patients who are severely cognitively impaired, immobile, nonambu-
latory and feeding tube dependent. See Multi-Society Task Force, supra note 1, at
1499, 1576. These traits characterize both the vegetative state and minimally con-
scious state. See id In the permanent vegetative state, for example, general life
expectancy is two to five years, with survival beyond 10 years uncommon and
survival beyond 15 years rare (one in 15,000 to one in 75,000 according to the
Multi-Society Task Force Report on PVS). See id; see also David Strauss et al.,
Prognosis for Survival and Improvement in Function in Children with Severe De-
velopment Disabilities, 31 J. PEDIATRICS 712, 715 (1997); Richard K. Eyman et al.,
The Life Expectancy of Profoundly Handicapped People With Mental Retardation,
323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 584, 588 (1990); Ashwal et al., Life Expectancy of Children
in a Persistent Vegetative State 10 PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY 27, 27 (1994).
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Finally, we believe it fair to claim that no one would freely choose to
enter into either state and that anyone who intentionally, or otherwise,
culpably placed someone else in either state would have done the patient
great harm and grave moral wrong. In neither condition, is an individual
able to live a life of interaction with others, to achieve one's own vision
of the good life, to fulfill one's goals, or to reach for one's dreams? Al-
though persons in both states are alive biologically, in neither state are
they more than minimally alive personally or biographically. For all
intents and purposes, both states equally obliterate an individual's per-
sonal and sapient existence, leaving him profoundly neurologically im-
paired. None of this, however, is to say that persons who have been re-
liably diagnosed as being in either state permanently have lost their hu-
man value or their right to be treated with respect. The disagreement is
about the meaning of valuing and respecting these individuals.
The factual differences between the two states has generated an as-
sumption on the part of the courts that persons in these two supposedly
distinct states ought to be treated radically different in terms of the ethi-
cal and legal obligations of others to continue to maintain their lives
with medical treatment. Adopting this position is a serious mistake. The
assumption that any degree of consciousness in a person - no matter
how minimal - makes a decision to forego life-sustaining medical
treatment much more ethically problematic, if not outright impermissi-
ble, is unjustifiable. In several important and fundamentally descriptive
ways, persons in these states are more alike than different. But more
importantly, the arguments for considering their ethical situations to be
dissimilar are erroneous in several basic and crucial ways.
First, the assumption that ceasing treatment on a minimally conscious
patient is highly ethically suspect or simply impermissible seems to rest
in large part on the fact that the patient is conscious and therefore able to
experience pain and suffering. This consideration militates against stop-
ping treatment because such non-action will cause the patient to suffer,
although it is irrelevant to vegetative patients because they do not expe-
rience pain. Because Robert Wendland or Michael Martin might experi-
ence pain or discomfort related to the cessation of medically provided
nutrition and hydration, as this argument goes, it is morally wrong to
undertake such an act in the first place - a factor that is not an issue for
vegetative patients.
This argument is fatally flawed for two reasons. First, the pain or suf-
fering associated with foregoing treatment of a minimally conscious
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patient can be avoided by the careful professional administration of an-
algesic medications. If it is ethically right to forego treatment and allow
any conscious patient to die, that patient need not pass from this world
in pain because we have the means to avoid this plainly undesirable re-
sult. Second, and more compelling, the argument for requiring continued
treatment of a minimally conscious patient ignores the pain and suffer-
ing the patient will have to undergo while his life is being prolonged.
Vegetative patients experience nothing with or without life-sustaining
treatment. In contrast, continued treatment of minimally conscious pa-
tients - precisely because they are conscious - may result in them
suffering for years, or even decades, and probably being wholly unable
to express adequately to anyone the depth of their pain, not to mention
their elemental sense of frustration and loss.
In other words, being kept alive in the minimally conscious state may
be far worse for the individual than being maintained in the vegetative
state. Judge McNatt was painfully aware of this aspect of his ruling:
"[I]t still can be debated whether [Mr. Wendland's] life is being pre-
served or he is being sentenced to life [by my order]." 64 In Mr. Wend-
land's case, the "life sentence" is to an indefinite term in a prison of
solitary confinement, unable to reach out to other persons, unable to
express himself, unable to even move, possibly deeply frustrated by be-
ing stranded in a diminished life he never wanted, yet able to suffer to
an extent ultimately known only by him. With the minimal degree of
awareness that gives him the capacity for pain and suffering - the pre-
cise extent or nature of which is unknown to others - the minimally
conscious patient potentially poses a much stronger case for allowing
death than the vegetative patient does due to the principle of mercy.
65
We hypothesize that the courts' great reluctance to approve of dis-
continuing medically provided nutrition and hydration in minimally
conscious patients also rests on the perception that stopping such treat-
ment and providing "terminal pain relief' is much closer to nonvolun-
tary active euthanasia and is, therefore, legally and morally objection-
able. This perception, we contend, is grounded in the fact that the patient
64. In re Wendland, Probate No. 65669, slip. op. at 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 9,
1998).
65. See Nancy L. Childs & Ronald E. Cranford, Termination of Nutrition and
Hydration in the Minimally Conscious State: Contrasting Clinical Views, 12 J.
HEAD TRAUMA REHABILITATION 70, 70 (Aug. 1997); Ronald Cranford, Misdiag-
nosing the Persistent Vegetative State, 313 B.M.J. 5, 6 (1996).
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is conscious to some extent, cannot refuse the treatment himself, and is
in need of analgesia and sedation. It therefore appears as if the patient's
life is being intentionally and directly terminated - and he is being
"drugged" in order to spare him the suffering that cessation of treatment
will generate for him.
This perception, however, possesses only superficial moral plausibil-
ity. With the possible exception of the provision of analgesia and seda-
tion (which is not necessary to avoid pain in the vegetative patient, but
is sometimes provided nonetheless), withdrawing medically provided
nutrition and hydration in a vegetative patient raises the identical con-
cerns. Yet, it remains a well-established and accepted procedure in
medicine, law, and ethics. 6
Neither the vegetative nor minimally conscious patient is terminally
ill. The fundamental ethical reasons for withdrawing treatment apply to
both states - the patient would not want to live in such a condition, and
treatment offers no appreciable benefit to the patient other than being
kept biologically alive. Furthermore, the patient has no reasonable
chance of recovering, 67 and the patient would likely want to be released
from such a state, relieving his family of the heartache of watching him
merely exist but not live. The desire not to kill the patient but to let na-
ture take its course by removing unwanted and nonbeneficial treatment
is the same for persons in both states. In fact, precisely because the
minimally conscious patient might suffer greatly if his life is prolonged,
the ethical case for stopping treatment and letting him die is even
stronger than if he were vegetative. While delving into the philosophical
distinction between the ethics of "killing" versus "allowing to die" is
beyond the scope of this Article, suffice it to say that if stopping treat-
ment on a minimally conscious patient is wrongful killing, the same
would hold true for the vegetative patient.
Third, both the Martin and Wendland courts were explicitly concerned
with the possibly pernicious consequences of permitting treatment to be
stopped in a minimally conscious patient. As discussed in detail above,
both courts were very worried about the implications for other persons
in similar situations if the wives of Michael Martin and Robert Wend-
66. See Position of the American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of
the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State, 39 NEUROLOGY 125,
125-26 (1989).
67. At least six physicians in the Wendland case opined that he would never
recover from his present state.
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land were to be permitted to refuse life-sustaining treatment, an action
that would surely lead to their husbands' deaths.
Only Judge McNatt clearly expressed his concern about less honest
and well-intentioned family members than Rose Wendland "allowing"
their conscious loved ones to die in order to inherit some money, to re-
lieve themselves of the burden of caring for the patient, or some other
selfish, ignoble, or corrupt motive. However, persons in the minimally
conscious state are not any more or less subject to having ethically sus-
pect decisions made on their behalf by unscrupulous relatives than are
other mentally incapacitated patients, be they terminally ill from cancer
or heart disease, slowing dying from the ravages of Alzheimer's, or
permanently unconscious after an auto accident. Improperly motivated
acts to allow someone to die should be resisted in regard to any patient,
and not simply the minimally conscious.
Judge McNatt and the Martin majority are most likely fearful that
deliberately allowing the minimally conscious to die for want of life-
sustaining medical treatment constitutes invidious discrimination against
the mentally disabled. This very accusation appeared in the Martin case
when the relatives opposing the wife's decision claimed that she and her
supporting witnesses held an invidious "bias against" persons with dis-
abilities "rooted in ...stereotypes" and were motivated by a "better
dead than disabled" viewpoint. 68
To be sure, persons in the minimally conscious state, like Michael
Martin and Robert Wendland, are mentally and physically disabled. So-
ciety should be vigilant about respecting the disabled and treating them
like other individuals. Medically beneficial treatment should never be
denied to a disabled person as a direct consequence of his disability or
as means of expressing invidious discrimination. Allowing a disabled
person to die is not, however, necessarily invidious discrimination, nor
does it necessarily demonstrate a homicidal or genocidal urge toward the
disabled. If the disabled can choose for themselves, they ought to be
given this choice like anyone else. If they cannot choose for themselves,
this does not mean that they should receive all available medical treat-
ment until they are swept away by death.
We concur with the analysis on this point offered by a California
Court of Appeal in a case involving the family's wish to discontinue
68. Thomas J. Marzen & Daniel Avila, Will the Real Michael Martin Please
Speak Up! Medical Decisionmaking for Questionably Competent Persons, 72 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 833, 837 n.20 (1995).
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medically provided nutrition and hydration in a vegetative patient, Wil-
liam Drabick.
[H]uman beings are not the passive subjects of medical technol-
ogy . . . .[California case law] recognize[s] that medical care
decisions must be guided by the individual patient's interests
and values. Allowing persons to determine their own medical
treatment is an important way in which society respects persons
as individuals. Moreover, the respect due to persons as individu-
als does not diminish simply because they have become incapa-
ble of participating in treatment decisions. While William's
coma precludes his participation, it is still possible for others to
make a decision that reflects his interests more closely than
would a purely technological decision to do whatever is possi-
ble. Lacking the ability to decide, he has a right to a decision
that takes his interests into account.69
When legitimate questions arise about the propriety of continuing medi-
cal treatment, all persons deserve to be treated as subjects and not ob-
jects. All persons deserve to have their individual interests and circum-
stances considered by a responsible and sensitive decision maker; no
one deserves to be treated as an object and potentially infused, invaded,
and accosted by whatever medical technology is available. Refusing
medical treatment on behalf of a disabled person may be right or it may
be wrong; the difference depends on the individual involved, his inter-
ests, his capacity for enjoyment and love, pain and suffering, -the nature
of his future life, not on whether he happens to be in the category of
"disabled" or, for that matter, the category of the "minimally conscious
state."
CONCLUSION
Decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from very
ill or injured patients are almost always difficult and heart-wrenching
for the family and health care professionals involved. Particularly diffi-
cult are those decisions made in the presence of intra-familial disagree-
ment about the propriety of this decision. 70 Strong opposition to the ces-
69. In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App.3d 185, 208 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
70. This Article deliberately does not address the possible significance of the
intra-family disagreement in both the Martin and Wendland cases. In both, the
court's resolution of the matter (requiring clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's decision) rendered irrelevant the dispute between their wives and other
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sation of treatment, even for persons in the permanent vegetative state,
still exists. Witness, for example, the recent case involving Hugh Finn in
Virginia, where that state's governor publicly tried to prevent Mr. Finn's
wife from withdrawing his medically provided nutrition and hydration
despite a state statute that permitted her to do so. 71
The opinions of the Martin majority and Judge McNatt also demon-
strate deep reservations about withholding life-sustaining treatment from
persons in the minimally conscious state. They assume that a sharp dis-
tinction exists between patients permanently in the minimally conscious
state and those who are permanently vegetative. As a direct result of
making this distinction, the striking judicial consensus 72 about foregoing
treatment of patients in the vegetative state is rendered irrelevant in
cases involving the minimally conscious patient.
We seriously question the underlying ethical and legal validity of this
assumption primarily because it fails to recognize the considerable fac-
tual similarities and to acknowledge that the ethical rationale for fore-
going life-sustaining treatment is at least equally applicable in both
cases and probably even more compelling for the minimally conscious
due to their capacity for further suffering. This Article is merely an in-
troduction to the medical, legal, and ethical aspects of this relatively
new diagnostic category. Surely more medical and ethical research
needs to be done in order to better understand-the minimally conscious
state and to explicate our moral obligations to those who have this
minimal amount of awareness and interaction with others.
Finally, we also question the assumption of a distinction between the
vegetative and minimally conscious states because it unreflectively
places the value of an individual's biological life over the value of his or
family members. However, we note that in Mr. Wendland's case, he was pro-
foundly estranged from both his mother and half-sister, while Robert's close family
members, his wife, his children, and his brother were all in agreement that he
would not want to live as he is and that all treatment should be stopped.
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Beyond the Vegetative State
her biographical and personal life. 7 For individuals reliably diagnosed
as being permanently in the vegetative state, as well as those in the
minimally conscious state, their biographical and personal life is over.
Many people would consider their lives over if they could no longer
communicate with others even in simple ways, create or maintain rela-
tionships with others, or act in the world in simple ways. The value and
the sacredness of human life is grounded in the personal, at least as
much as in the biological.
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